Intelligence Issues For Congress (OpenCRS.org)

Image via WikipediaOne of my favorite sites for finding interesting new documents, Docuticker, recently highlighted an October, 2010 Congressional Research Service (CRS) report, Intelligence Issues For Congress. 

With a new Congress about to be sworn in and the balance of power shifting in the House, this list of issues is worth examining by anyone interested in the direction of the US national security intelligence community.

For those of you unfamiliar with the CRS, it is one of the most reputable sources of information and informed analysis currently available on the planet.

Unfortunately, it is exclusively for the use of members of Congress and, unless a member of Congress releases a report, the CRS's analysis does not see the light of day.  Organizations like the Federation Of American Scientists and OpenCRS.org pick up on any reports that are made public and host them (which is how Docuticker got this one).

Below is my edited version of the summary (You can download the full PDF here).  I cut out the stuff that I thought would be familiar to SAM's readers and have highlighted those parts (in bold) that I thought would most interesting.  Other than that, the words below are direct quotes:

• Making cooperation effective presents substantial leadership and managerial challenges. The needs of intelligence “consumers”—ranging from the White House to Cabinet agencies to military commanders—must all be met, using the same systems and personnel. Intelligence collection systems are expensive and some critics suggest there have been elements of waste and unneeded duplication of effort while some intelligence “targets” have been neglected.

• The DNI has substantial statutory authorities to address these issues, but the organizational relationships remain complex, especially for Defense Department agencies. Members of Congress will be seeking to observe the extent to which effective coordination is accomplished.

• International terrorism, a major threat facing the United States in the 21st century, presents a difficult analytical challenge, vividly demonstrated by the attempted bombing of a commercial aircraft approaching Detroit on December 25, 2009. Counterterrorism requires the close coordination of intelligence and law enforcement agencies, but there remain many institutional and procedural issues that complicate cooperation between the two sets of agencies.

• Techniques for acquiring and analyzing information on small groups of plotters differ significantly from those used to evaluate the military capabilities of other countries. U.S. intelligence efforts are complicated by unfilled requirements for foreign language expertise. Whether all terrorist surveillance efforts have been consistent with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA) has been a matter of controversy.

• Intelligence on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was inaccurate and Members have criticized the performance of the intelligence community in regard to current conditions in Iraq, Iran, and other areas. Improved analysis, while difficult to mandate, remains a key goal. Better human intelligence, it is widely agreed, is also essential.

• Intelligence support to military operations continues to be a major responsibility of intelligence agencies. The use of precision guided munitions depends on accurate, real-time targeting data; integrating intelligence data into military operations challenges traditional organizational relationships and requires innovative technological approaches. Stability operations now underway in Afghanistan may require very different sets of intelligence skills.

Teaching Budgeting To Intelligence Analysts (Link List)

One of the things we like to expose our students to here at Mercyhurst is the unspeakable horror of the budgeting process.  If learning to be an intelligence analyst were not difficult enough, trying to figure out what that analysis is worth and what you can reasonably charge for it, is sheer, but necessary, agony for most students.

To make the process a little more interesting (or maybe just a little less onerous), there are a number of simulators that I have either used or would recommend to add depth to lessons on budgeting for intel analysts.  All of these simulations help teach the points that budgeting is often a series of painful trade-offs, that some expenses or policies that receive an awful lot of attention don't really matter when it comes to balancing a budget and, finally, understanding your priorities is the key to achieving your goals while staying within your budget.

http://doiop.com/BudgHero

Budget Hero.  This is one of my favorites and I have used this successfully in class.  This simulation asks the student to determine which policies they wish to enact and which they wish to ignore and then shows how their decisions will impact the US federal budget next year and over the next 20 years.  The data is mostly current and is based on Congressional Budget Office figures and projections. 

http://doiop.com/NYTBudgPuzz

New York Times Budget Puzzle.  The target in this recent interactive infographic is the same as above -- the US federal budget.  The presentation is very different, however.  The interface is simpler and it would be a better choice if time is an issue.

www.budgetsimulator.com

Budget Simulator.  This online product is very different from either of the previous two simulators.  Here, you can actually create your own budget, list your own priorities and involve your students in establishing what matters within the scope of a budget.  The possibilities here are quite intriguing.  For example, the East Sussex County  Council in the UK is using the simulator to help gather input on how they should cut the budget by a whopping 30%.  

I am sure there are other budget simulation programs and games available.  Leave your favorite in the comments!

147th Anniversary Of The Gettysburg Address (Britannica Blog and Neatorama)

On November 19, 1863, Abraham Lincoln stood up and gave a five minute dedication for the Soldier's National Cemetery at the Gettysburg battlefield that went on to become one of the most famous speeches in history.

In case you haven't heard it in a while, here is a pretty good reading of it.

Via Neatorama and the Britannica Blog 

Gettysburg Address from Adam Gault on Vimeo.

Does The Future Belong To Robots? (Institute For the Future)

The Institute For The Future does some interesting long-range analysis. In the past they have focused on a variety of issues including things such as health and food but recently they decided to take on robots.

The method in this most recent effort seems to be a more or less straight line extrapolation based on existing trends but, as with all deep-future work, one of the real benefits of the analysis is the mental model of the question.

The Institute sees robots participating in our lives at three levels (see the embedded graphic below for more details or download the PDF). The first, automation, appears to be where we are now, with robots automating processes that were formerly done by humans. The second level is augmentation, where robots add to our existing capabilities, such as driving the car for us. The final level is understanding, where robots begin to interact with us in ways that are indistinguishable from the ways we interact with other humans.

The Institute is also very good at visualizing their data and this chart is no exception. I think visualizing the results of analysis is a pretty important skill for all analysts, so I always take a look at their stuff for new ideas. The small embed below may be difficult to read or navigate so I strongly suggest downloading the PDF file so you can examine the style of report more easily and in more detail.

Another thing that might be interesting to readers who don't track this technology very closely is how many examples of each of these levels (and in how many areas) the analysts at the Institute were able to find. It seems that the robot future may be closer than we think. It is thought-provoking analysis on many levels.

Is The US's COIN Doctrine Fighting The "Last War"? (Original Research)

One doesn't often find an academic critique of a US Army Field Manual but that is exactly what recent Mercyhurst graduate Brian Gabriel set out to do in his thesis, "Evaluating The Transferability Of Counterinsurgency Doctrine:  From The Cold War To Global Insurgency".

In this instance, Brian's target was FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency.  In general, Brian was seeking to explore the "transferability" of the US's new doctrine:  Would this doctrine work with respect to future conflicts in new geographical locations at any scale or was it designed, as new doctrines sometimes are, to win the "last war"? Brian was specifically trying to determine if "the new doctrine truly provides a framework to defeat insurgencies around the world regardless of the nature of the insurgency or if the doctrine’s utility is more limited."  

Brian does many of the usual things you would expect to see in a thesis such as this and does them well.  His literature review, for example, covers the history of US counterinsurgency doctrine, the genesis of the new doctrine and the critiques of that doctrine in a well-written and interesting way that contains enough detail without coming across as overwhelming. 

Brian then uses the precepts that underlie the manual and the criticisms of the manual as a jumping off point for his own analysis based on "a total of seven insurgencies, from Malaya to Somalia, and the approaches of counter-insurgent forces from three countries—Great Britain, France, and the United States.  In addition, the transferability of FM 3-24 was evaluated through the use of two methodologies, one theoretical and another providing real-world perspective."

Brian uses a nifty matrix to capture and display the results of his analysis.  I have included a reduced size version of the matrix with this post but it is really worth the effort to download the full thesis and walk through Brian's dissection not only of the FM but also of its critics.  

Ultimately Brian finds, "Despite the critiques of some counterinsurgency theorists, FM 3-24 has a high level of transferability.  The transferability of FM 3-24 is not limited by a change in the geopolitical environment, a shift in the motivations of insurgents, the presence of third-party counter-insurgents, nor other characteristics that differentiate insurgencies today from the twentieth century.  This means that the doctrine’s precepts—the balance of offensive, defensive, and stability operations, the importance of intelligence-driven operations, the necessity of training host nation security forces, etc—remain valid in a post-anti-colonial era.  This result, however, only applies to domestic insurgencies.  Serious questions emerge about the doctrine when it is applied to regional or global insurgencies."

If you are interested in counterinsurgency operations at all, it is worth a look.  You can download the full text here.