Saturday, July 5, 2008

Designing Safe Living, Architectures Of Control And Wine Economics (Link List)

Virtually everyone knows that the way a large grocery store is laid out is a careful exercise in design. All the fresh veggies as you come in the entrance and all those free sample carts at the end of the aisle are designed to get you to buy more -- and more expensive -- items.

Using design principles to manipulate people in predictable ways is not particularly new but I happened to run across a trio of very interesting posts on this idea that seemed worth sharing.

The first is from the American Association of Wine Economists (where do I sign up?) titled, They Always Buy The Ten Cent Wine (via Marginal Revolution). Apparently the way wines are organized on a shelf is designed to make sure you see the expensive, special occasion wines.

The second is not so much a post but a blog called Architectures Of Control. Besides having a very cool blog name (is it a blog or a thrash metal band?), the author, Dan Lockton, is a PHD researcher in Industrial Design at Brunel University (which also has one of the few intel studies programs in Europe) in the UK. The evolution in Dan's thinking about how to use architecture to control people, for good and bad purposes, is fascinating to watch. He is a keen observer of this niche and is always worth reading.

Finally (and I read this on AOC), there is actually a conference on using design to improve security: New Science s Of Protection--Designing Safe Living in Lancaster, UK from 10-12 July, 2008.

Related Posts:
The Serious Play Series

Friday, July 4, 2008

Let Freedom Blog! Chinese Dissidents Write Backwards To Beat Government Filters (WSJ via Digital Inspiration)

Great article in the Wall Street Journal recently about recent rioting on southern China and how Chinese bloggers are defeating internet censorship, in one case, by using a simple widget that lets them write backwards. The text is still readable but the automatic filters set up by the government don't recognize it (The WSJ has a paywall so if you want to see the full article, take a look at it soon. Digital Inspiration has a summary and some additional links).

Thursday, July 3, 2008

Part 4 -- What Would A Good Definition Look Like? (What Is Intelligence?)

Part 1 -- The Problem Of "Intelligence"
Part 2 -- The Importance Of A Clear Definition Of Intelligence
Part 3 -- The Reasons For A Lack Of A Definition

The changing nature of intelligence coupled with the wide variety of new entrants and the lack of academic evaluation over the centuries has muddied the waters of today. Now, a common definition of intelligence has to, potentially, take into account not only the intelligence activities of nation states but also those intelligence or intelligence-like activities conducted by law enforcement, NGOs or the private sector. Such a definition would be, ideally, broad enough to apply to any level of activity.

Imagine two seemingly very different scenarios. In the first, a country seeks intelligence on the capabilities and intentions of an enemy; in the second, you are in the process of buying a car. In the first case, the country performs a wide variety of activities designed to collect information such as listening to the enemy’s broadcasts or reading its newspapers, perhaps even sending in some spies, recruiting some agents and planting some bugs.

In the second instance you, too, might spend time gathering relevant information by listening to advertisements or automobile shows like Car Talk or Top Gear. You would almost certainly read the newspapers, check out the classified ads and search the internet for deals. You might even send in a “spy”, a friend, to go to a nearby car dealer to assess how willing the dealer was to negotiate. You might even go yourself, telling little white lies about your car-buying intentions in order to keep the salesperson guessing. Clearly, both you and the country would want to hide some of your information or activities from the other party.

Armed with some information on the enemy, the analysts of our hypothetical country would begin to sift through it, to come to conclusions that would help the decisionmakers in the country better understand the intentions of that enemy. Likewise, you would need to sift through your automobile research to see what seemed relevant and what seemed unhelpful. Finally, both must come to a tentative conclusion regarding the intentions of the “other side”, enemy or car salesperson. It is tentative because of all the uncertainty involved; uncertainty due to the quality of the sources, uncertainty due to the limited amount of time devoted to the analysis, uncertainty because of the possibility of deliberate deception in both cases. It is from these analytic conclusions, no matter how formally or informally constructed, that decisions can now be made.

Other than the focus of the inquiry and the scale of the investigation, there does not appear to be much difference in the process involved in these two cases. Yet the first is clearly traditional intelligence activity while the second is not. Is there a substantive difference between these two activities and, if not, then what definition of intelligence would cover them both?

One standard that cannot reasonably be applied is “importance”. Just because an example is a relatively unimportant one, as is the example of doing the research to buy a car, it does not mean that an honest theorist can eliminate it from consideration. Whether you are building the Taj Mahal or a dog house, you are still employing the principles of engineering and architecture. The importance of the example does not matter. Likewise, a good definition of intelligence needs to encompass a broader range of activity than just that found in the national security arena. A good definition of intelligence must work across disciplines, indeed across history, and must work for both simple and complex examples.

A good definition of intelligence must also clearly differentiate intelligence activity from non-intelligence activity. It should be possible to know, based on the definition, whether one is engaged in intelligence activity or not, otherwise, intelligence is not a profession; it is merely an attempt to re-brand some other, more established, activity as “intelligence”. In other words, a good definition of intelligence should make it clear not only what intelligence is but, equally clearly, what it isn’t.

Tomorrow -- Previous Attempts To Define Intelligence

Wednesday, July 2, 2008

MCIIS Participation In Graffiti Task Force Highlighted (Goerie.com)

In case you missed it in this morning's Erie Times News (doesn't everyone read that?), the paper highlighted the Institute of Intelligence Studies' participation in the anti-graffiti task force here in Erie. The effort is pretty large but we are just doing the analysis part. Interesting work for Professor Dave Grabelski and some of his students!

Part 3 -- The Reasons For A Lack Of A Definition (What Is Intelligence?)

Part 1 -- The Problem Of Intelligence
Part 2 -- The Importance Of A Clear Definition Of Intelligence

Why is there no generally accepted definition of “intelligence”?

It is certainly not for lack of effort. Numerous attempts to define intelligence exist in federal law, in the mission statements of the various agencies, corporations, and other bodies that conduct intelligence activities, as well as in the writings of scholars and intelligence practitioners. The net effect of all these attempts, however, is to only sow confusion.

For example, until very recently, the CIA, on its “kid’s page”, found the question, "What is intelligence?” so difficult that it balked at providing an answer, noting, “What is intelligence? This question is not easy to answer and, depending on who you ask, you may get different answers."(Note: The CIA has upgraded it’s “Kid’s Page” and now states that “intelligence is the information our nation’s leaders need to keep our country safe.” This is, as we shall see shortly, a deeply misleading definition).

Mark M. Lowenthal, a long-time veteran of the national security and private sector intelligence communities, notes in his book, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, "Virtually every book written on the subject of intelligence begins with a discussion of what 'intelligence' means, or at least how the author intends to use the term. This editorial fact tells us much about the field of intelligence. In spite of earnest efforts to lay down a comprehensive definition of what they do, even seasoned intelligence professionals often see their field as something vague and nebulous, which is constantly re-imagined in a never-ending search for purpose.

This lack of clarity is largely the artifact of two historical trends and one, more recent, development. Historically, intelligence units were small and focused on the relatively few wealthy or politically powerful citizens in an enemy country or competing organization. These units were also quite insular, using codes and compartments to isolate key bits of information even from other members of the organization. In this context, decisionmakers from Sun Tzu to George Washington often operated as their own spymasters and the decisions they made were intricately bound up with the intelligence operations they ran. As a result, and also along historical lines, academia traditionally had little role in analyzing or generalizing the activities of these intelligence organizations. Sherman Kent, often referred to as the “Father of US Intelligence Analysis”, noted the lack of academic contributions in 1955:

“What [intelligence] lacks is a literature.... What I am talking about is a literature dedicated to the analysis of our many-sided calling, and produced by its most knowledgeable devotees.... The literature I have in mind will, among other things, be an elevated debate."

A lack of academic evaluation was partly a function of the system under consideration. Information regarding intelligence operations was difficult to get, if it existed at all. It is also likely that many of these historical figures discouraged excessive investigation into their sources and methods either in order to preserve a capability or out of vanity. Whatever the reason, the lack of academic scrutiny meant that intelligence, as a concept, remained undeveloped. (Note: There is still quite a ways to go to catch up with other disciplines even today. According to the College Board, there were at least 220 undergraduate degree programs in engineering in the United States and 131 undergraduate architecture programs. Compare this to the approximately 45 undergraduate programs offering any courses at all in intelligence nationwide).

Beginning with World War I and increasing exponentially since the advent of the internet, the tidal wave of information now available to each of us is the development that has served, in some senses, to expand the definition of intelligence. Analysts at all levels and in all disciplines can now find online for little or no cost formerly expensive or difficult to find resources and capabilities once available only to elites. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), like the Southern Poverty Law Center and the International Relations and Security Network, have entered the world of intelligence along with a variety of commercial enterprises, such as iJet and STRATFOR – entries made possible by a steady stream of information from all parts of the world on virtually any subject. Even casinos claim to use intelligence (Thanks, Kathleen!).

Where these organizations fall on the spectrum of intelligence and intelligence-like activities is unclear but the overlap in sources, methods, capabilities and purposes only serve to highlight the need for and lack of a clear, "big-tent" definition of intelligence.

Tomorrow -- What Would A Good Definition Of Intelligence Look Like?