Hizballah, Deception And The 2006 Summer War (Thesis)

The CARL has just uploaded an NPS thesis that should be of interest to anyone studying either Hizballah or deception. Highlights from the abstract include (Boldface mine):

• "This paper will demonstrate that Hizballah, fighting an asymmetric conflict with Israel, used deception very effectively in their defense of southern Lebanon during the 2006 Summer War; this use of deception significantly offset many of Israel’s hard power advantages. It will also show that Hizballah’s use of information technologies greatly enhanced their ability to wield deception."
  

How To Reform Intelligence Reform (Testimony)

Robert Hutchings, Diplomat in Residence at the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton and formerly the Director of the NIC, recently testified before Congress regarding the state of intelligence reform. In what has to be one of the bluntest reports on record, Hutchings lays out his problems with recent reform efforts and outlines five recommendations for "reforming the reform". It is compelling testimony with a number of surprising insights that make this a "must read". Highlights include (Boldface and italics are mine):

• "Let me first preview my bottom line: namely, that the organizational changes that led to the creation of the office of the DNI were undertaken without addressing the other aspects of the 9/11 Commission recommendations. The result, I fear, may leave us worse off rather than better."

• "The pre-war debate was never about the intelligence but about the policy. Yet the policymakers who launched the war and the members of Congress who voted for it, chose to blame it all on faulty intelligence. Neither the 9/11 Commission nor the WMD Commission addressed the failures of policy, which were vastly more serious than anything the intelligence community did or failed to do."

• "Democrats attacked the intelligence community to get at the president; Republicans attacked it to protect him. What both sides agreed on was to stick it to the intelligence community."

• "Let me hasten to add that the intelligence community did and does need reform. But these reforms were debated in the worst possible climate for sound judgment."

• "This idea is also tied up with what I call the “coordination myth”: namely, that it is somehow possible to “coordinate” the work of hundreds of thousands of people across dozens of agencies operating in nearly every country of the world. Anyone who has worked in complex organizations knows, or should know, that it is possible to coordinate only a few select activities and that there are always tradeoffs, because every time you coordinate some activities you are simultaneously weakening coordination among others."

• With those thoughts in mind, let me offer five suggestions for intelligence reform, none of which entail further organizational change.

• First, fix the “demand” side of the problem.

• In 2004, when I was Chairman of the National Intelligence Council, we produced a bleak assessment of the Iraqi insurgency that incurred presidential wrath when it leaked to the New York Times. But the real story was that the President hadn’t read it – not even the one-page “Presidential Summary”! (This is the second time this has been brought up in the last week. See With Spies Like These for the previous reference).
  

• This is not a marketplace in which intelligence products have any intrinsic value; they are freely and routinely ignored.

• Second and relatedly, create an interagency strategic planning group.

• Interagency planning may seem obvious, but it does not happen because administrations do not want it. Individual departments certainly do not: they want their own pet projects held close until the last possible moment rather than having them run up against the competing ideas of other departments.

• Third, strengthen Congressional oversight, as the 9/11 Commission recommended.

• In the past year or so there have been two National Intelligence Estimates on terrorism – with quite alarming findings. But to my knowledge no Congressional hearings on those estimates have occurred. On the second of those estimates, concerning threats to the homeland, General Hayden said (at the Council on Foreign Relations) that 70% of the information came from detainee interrogations. This is worrying for two reasons: it shows how poor our penetration of terrorist networks still is, and this dependency on (often dated) detainee information can turn into a circular argument for continuing our disastrous detainee policy. Have there been Congressional hearings to look into this?

• Fourth, accentuate the strategic coordinating role of the DNI and de-emphasize the centralization of operational functions.

• Let me focus on the very first of the 33 “enabling objectives” of the 500-day plan – to formalize a “National Intelligence University.” I think I know what a university is. What the IC intends is not one; it is a training center. Calling it a university is a triumph of form over substance.

• This then leads to my fifth and final recommendation: begin the evolutionary process of changing the culture of intelligence.

• This will entail a radical re-conceptualization of what “intelligence” is and should be. We have moved from an era in which clandestinely acquired information accounted for a large chunk of what we needed to know (or thought we needed to know) into one in which our “secrets” count for relatively little for most of the issues that affect our national well-being. (Again, see With Spies Like These... for a recent reference to this same issue).
  

Islamic Justifications For The Use Of Armed Force (Dissertation)

Fazal Mohammed Hassan wrote his dissertation (back in 2005 -- so excuse me if you have already seen it) on "Ending Oppression And Establishing Justice: Examples From Islamic History Of Select Muslims And Islamist Groups Justifying The Use Of Armed Force" while at Florida State University. I have not had time to read it in detail (and do not pretend to be an expert in this area) but I found the sections I skimmed generally well-organized and useful, if only for its substantial use of primary sources. Also useful were the author's perspectives on the roots of justified violence in Islam and the detailed discussion of key, modern Islamic figures (including bin Laden and al-Zawahiri). Highlights from the abstract (the full text is 238 pages) include:

• "This dissertation examines the justification for using armed force throughout Islam’s history. Special emphasis will be made to the following three terms, harb, jihad, and qital. These three words translate into war, struggle, and fight respectively."
  

• "This work covers Mohammed, the Kharijites, the Assassins, Ibn Taymiyya, Sayyid Qutb, al-Jihad, and al-Qaeda, with emphasis placed on Mohammed and Qutb as key figures, and their respective justifications for using or writing about resorting to armed force as a means to an end."
  

• "It is the main thesis of this work that violence committed in the name of God by Muslims throughout Islam’s history is based upon the need to end oppression and establish justice."
  

• "Though this topic has gained momentum since the events of 9/11, it is the intention of this work to show that using armed force is not new, but a political instrument used to establish Shari’ah or Islamic law. The term “political” is used because for most Muslims, including all those mentioned in this dissertation, believe that Islam is not just a personal belief system, like most in the West believe, but an ideology that is to be used for all times and for all facets of life."
  

According to the bio sketch in the dissertation, Hassan was born in Bangalore, India and has received a bachelors in Sociology, a Masters in Asian Studies and his Ph.D. in Humanities (in 2006). Ratemyprofessors.com indicates he is currently at Florida International University, though he is not listed in the faculty directory there.

Domestic Counterterror Roundup (RAND, CRS)

Two good reports that should be of interest to the domestic counterterror/homeland security crowd in the feeds over the last several days. The first is by RAND and is titled, "Securing America's Passenger-Rail Systems". While the report is focused on domestic rail systems, I found the methodology used by the authors to be worth a closer look. They state, and I agree, that it could be extended to other areas of research concerning infrastructure. Highlights include (Boldface is mine):

• "Even though there have been no successful attacks on rail systems in the United States recently, the FBI and local police departments have thwarted several planned attacks against the New York subway system alone. The use of passenger rail and the frequency with which terrorists target it call for a commitment to analyzing and improving rail security in the United States."
  

• "...we found that the most prevalent terrorist threat to rail systems comes from bombings, that most terrorist attacks on rail systems produce few fatalities and injuries, and that attacks in densely packed rail cars and interior rail-facility locations are of particular concern because of the casualties they can produce."
  

• "In addition, given the damage associated with a relatively small number of large attacks, security measures that prevent only the largest-scale attacks could significantly reduce the human costs associated with this threat."
  

• "The vulnerability assessment identified 11 potential target locations (e.g., system operation and power infrastructure) within a notional rail system and eight potential attack modes (e.g., small explosives). These targets and attack modes were combined to produce 88 different attack scenarios of concern."
  

• "We identified 17 security-improvement options (SIOs) within three broad categories: (1) process-based improvements (e.g., implementing enhanced security training), (2) technology-based alternatives (e.g., using portable [handheld] detection systems), and (3) infrastructure and facility modifications (e.g., installing blast-resistant containers)...The 17 security measures were rated for their incremental impact at each layer, as well as to their potential system-level contribution across layers."
  

• "Thus, we can predict with near certainty that terrorist-attack patterns will change in the future, though we cannot predict with much certainty precisely how those changes will be manifested. Given this uncertainty, rail-security systems must be designed to be responsive to potential changes in attack patterns, and the consequent impact on the relative effectiveness of the security portfolio must be reevaluated periodically."
  

The second report is from CRS and is titled "Terrorism and Security Issues Facing the Water Infrastructure Sector". This report is much less reassuring. Reading it in conjunction with the RAND study on rails makes me hope that RAND will apply their method to the water system as well. It might help Congress focus a bit more usefully. Highlights include (Boldface and italics are mine):

• "There are no federal standards or agreed upon industry best practices within the water infrastructure sector to govern readiness, response to security incidents, and recovery. Efforts to develop protocols and tools are ongoing since the 2001 terrorist attacks."
  

• "A key issue is how additional protections and resources directed at public and private sector priorities will be funded. In response, Congress has provided $789 million in appropriations for security at water infrastructure facilities (to assess and protect federal facilities and support vulnerability assessments by non-federal facilities) and passed a bill requiring drinking water utilities to conduct security vulnerability assessments (P.L. 107-188). When Congress created the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2002 (P.L. 107-297), it gave DHS responsibilities to coordinate information to secure the nation’s critical infrastructure, including the water sector. Under Homeland Security Presidential Directive-7, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is the lead federal agency for protecting drinking water and wastewater utility systems." (Interesting. Anyone know how much experience EPA has with terrorism or physical security issues in general?)
  

• "Recent congressional interest has focused on bills concerning security of wastewater utilities. In the 109th Congress, the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee approved legislation to encourage wastewater treatment works to conduct vulnerability assessments and develop site security plans (S. 2781), but there was no further action on this bill. Similar legislation has been introduced in the 110th Congress (S. 1968)."

The chart below is taken directly from the CRS report and includes appropriations to the Department of Energy (DOE), Bureau of Reclamation (Bureau) and the Army Corps of Engineers (COE).

One Stop Shopping; Current US National Strategies

Mike Yared (mike_yared@hotmail.com) posted a great list of many (if not all) of the current US strategy documents available on the web on Michigan State's H-WAR listserve last week and has kindly allowed me to cross post them here (Thanks Mike and Steve!):

Current U.S. National Strategies from http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/archive.html

National Strategy for Homeland Security July 2002 White House Office of
Homeland Security
http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/book/index.html

National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace February 2003 White House
http://www.whitehouse.gov/pcipb/cyberspace_strategy.pdf

National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure and
Key Assets February 2003 White House
http://www.whitehouse.gov/pcipb/physical_strategy.pdf

National Military Strategy February 2004 (March 2005?) Joint Chiefs of Staff
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2005/d20050318nms.pdf

National Defense Strategy March 2005 (April 2005?) Office of the Secretary
of Defense
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Apr2005/d20050408strategy.pdf

National Intelligence Strategy October 2005 Office of the Director of
National Intelligence
http://www.dni.gov/publications/NISOctober2005.pdf

National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza November 2005 Homeland Security
Council
http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/nspi.pdf

National Strategy for Victory in Iraq November 2005 National Security
Council
http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/iraq/iraq_national_strategy_20051130.pdf

National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction February
2006 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
http://www.defenselink.mil/pdf/NMS-CWMD2006.pdf

National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism February 2006
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/2006-01-25-Strategic-Plan.pdf

National Strategy for Combating Terrorism September 2006 National Security
Council
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/counter_terrorism/counter_terrorism_strategy.pdf

The National Security Strategy
http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/nss2006.pdf
http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf

National Counterintelligence Strategy March 2007 Office of the Director of
National Intelligence
http://www.ncix.gov/publications/policy/FinalCIStrategyforWebMarch21.pdf