Jihadi Communications Techniques (Link List)

I have stumbled across a number of fairly recent but obviously not new articles about how various Islamic extremist groups use modern media and the internet to communicate. The titles and the links are listed below, in case you haven't seen them (click on the link to download the full text):

Communication And Media Strategy In the Jihadi War Of Ideas

The Radical Dawa In Transition: The Rise Of Islamic Neoradicalism In The Netherlands (Not technically about communications strategies but there is a section in the report on these strategies)

A Framework For Understanding Terrorist Use Of The Internet

Al Qaeda: Propaganda And Media Strategy (with thanks to The CARL!)

Darfur: A Cultural Handbook (ARAG)

The Advanced Research And Assessment Group of the Defence Academy of the United Kingdom published last April an outstanding cultural guide (written by Tony Lindsay) on the Darfur region and the ongoing crisis there (Download the full text here). It would make an excellent primer for a student or analyst who was new to the region or as a quick reference guide for a more seasoned analyst. I was particularly impressed with the extensive list of Darfuri and Chadian rebel groups, the section on the Sudanese naming system and the annex on how to do business in Darfur.

Pakistan-US Relations (Lead And Background Info: CRS)

In the wake of the Bhutto Assassination, I thought this recent CRS document (download full text here, hosted by the FAS) might prove interesting. Written in October 2007, it gives some detailed background information that might be of use. Beyond the background, there are some leads here as to who might be the perpetrators (Italics, bold and hyperlinks are mine):

• "On October 18 (2007), former Prime Minister Bhutto made good on her promise to return to Pakistan after more than eight years of self imposed exile and was welcomed in Karachi by up to one million supporters. (Hours later, two bomb blasts near her motorcade — likely perpetrated by suicide attackers — left at least 115 people dead, but Bhutto was unharmed.) While Bhutto continues to enjoy significant public support in the country, especially in her home region of rural Sindh, there are signs that many PPP members are ambivalent about her return and worry that her credibility as an opponent of military rule has been damaged through deal-making with Musharraf."
  

• "Bhutto has alleged that some pro-jihadist retired Pakistani military officers have plotted her assassination, and Baitullah Mehsud (plus more here and here), a pro-Taliban militant commander in South Waziristan, vowed to launch suicide attacks against her. The government deployed thousands of security troops to safeguard her Karachi arrival (Zahid Hussain, “Triumph or Tumult for Bhutto?,” Wall Street Journal Asia, October 18, 2007)"
  

• "The leadership of the country’s leading moderate, secular, and arguably most popular party — the Pakistan People’s Party — seek greater U.S. support for Pakistani democratization and warn that the space in which they are allowed to operate is so narrow as to bring into question their continued viability as political forces. They also identify a direct causal link between nondemocratic governance and the persistence of religious militancy in Pakistan. According to former Prime Minister Bhutto, “Political dictatorship and social hopelessness create the desperation that fuels religious extremism .... Civil unrest is what the extremists want. Anarchy and chaos suit them.” She asserts that elements of Pakistan’s security apparatus are sympathetic to religious extremists and that these elements can only be neutralized by being made answerable to an elected government."
  

• "Many analysts consider a potential accommodation between President Musharraf and former Prime Minister Bhutto to be the best option both for stabilizing Islamabad’s political circumstances and for more effectively creating a moderate and prosperous Pakistan (some reports have the U.S. government quietly encouraging Musharraf to pursue this option). Such accommodation might include Musharraf retiring from the military following his reelection as President and allowing Bhutto to return to Pakistan and run for national office. Even as this arrangement may be in process, it is highly unlikely to alter the army’s role as ultimate arbiter of the country’s foreign and national security policies, but might create a transitional alliance that would empower Pakistan’s more liberal and secular elements."
  

Watching The Story Unfold: The Bhutto Assassination (Wikipedia)

One of the best open source places to watch a story unfold such as the Bhutto Assassination is on Wikipedia. Authors from all over the world rapidly converge on the site to update it with current news and speculation. As with any source, it is not definitive but it can be up to date and often includes views from all over the world. Currently the site contains a useful list of international reactions and some information regarding the immediate reaction in Pakistan itself. There is also a fairly exhaustive reference list. Expect this site to be updated regularly (a number of references were added while I type this).

Intelligence Estimates: How Useful To Congress? (CRS)

The CRS recently released a report (now available here in full text through the FAS) on NIEs and their increasing importance to Congress. The thing that interested me most was the discussion of the role of Congress in the recent spate of public NIE releases (including ones on Iran's Nuclear Intentions, Prospects For Iraq's Stability, the original and the update, the Terrorist Threat To The Homeland and Trends in Global Terrorism). Here are some of the other highlights from the Conclusion (I have separated the findings in order to make it easier to read and, as always, the boldface and italics are mine):

• "Congress is and will continue to be an important consumer of national intelligence, but there are concerns that heavy emphasis on mandating NIEs may not assist the legislative process to the extent that some anticipate. NIEs can provide the Intelligence Community’s best evidence and analysis on major issues of national security and can highlight areas where information is lacking, but they usually require lengthy preparation and coordination before they can be disseminated."
  

• "The example of the NIE on Iraqi WMD suggests that compressing the production schedule can be counterproductive."
  

• "Moreover, conclusions of NIEs may not be informed by knowledge of initiatives planned or underway by others in the executive or legislative branches."
  

• "A more public role for NIEs in debates on national security policy issues could obscure their inherent limitations and distort the discussion of the policy issues."
  

• "In some cases, Congress may find intelligence assessments or briefings prepared in a less structured way and within tighter time constraints better serve its legislative needs than formal NIEs."
  

• "The creation of the Office of the DNI provides a focal point from which the analytical capabilities of all intelligence agencies can be brought to bear on given issues, even ones that are narrowly focused. It is considered likely that a combination of NIEs on some topics, supplemented by more limited assessments supported by an ongoing dialogue with intelligence analysts, may provide the most effective support to the legislative process." (Historically, of course, the Executive Branch has been the primary consumer of intelligence. While this is unlikely to change, an increased interest by Congress -- the branch that controls the purse strings -- coupled with the DNI as the primary POC, is likely to lead to a more independent intel community and a stronger DNI.)