Is The US's COIN Doctrine Fighting The "Last War"? (Original Research)

One doesn't often find an academic critique of a US Army Field Manual but that is exactly what recent Mercyhurst graduate Brian Gabriel set out to do in his thesis, "Evaluating The Transferability Of Counterinsurgency Doctrine:  From The Cold War To Global Insurgency".

In this instance, Brian's target was FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency.  In general, Brian was seeking to explore the "transferability" of the US's new doctrine:  Would this doctrine work with respect to future conflicts in new geographical locations at any scale or was it designed, as new doctrines sometimes are, to win the "last war"? Brian was specifically trying to determine if "the new doctrine truly provides a framework to defeat insurgencies around the world regardless of the nature of the insurgency or if the doctrine’s utility is more limited."  

Brian does many of the usual things you would expect to see in a thesis such as this and does them well.  His literature review, for example, covers the history of US counterinsurgency doctrine, the genesis of the new doctrine and the critiques of that doctrine in a well-written and interesting way that contains enough detail without coming across as overwhelming. 

Brian then uses the precepts that underlie the manual and the criticisms of the manual as a jumping off point for his own analysis based on "a total of seven insurgencies, from Malaya to Somalia, and the approaches of counter-insurgent forces from three countries—Great Britain, France, and the United States.  In addition, the transferability of FM 3-24 was evaluated through the use of two methodologies, one theoretical and another providing real-world perspective."

Brian uses a nifty matrix to capture and display the results of his analysis.  I have included a reduced size version of the matrix with this post but it is really worth the effort to download the full thesis and walk through Brian's dissection not only of the FM but also of its critics.  

Ultimately Brian finds, "Despite the critiques of some counterinsurgency theorists, FM 3-24 has a high level of transferability.  The transferability of FM 3-24 is not limited by a change in the geopolitical environment, a shift in the motivations of insurgents, the presence of third-party counter-insurgents, nor other characteristics that differentiate insurgencies today from the twentieth century.  This means that the doctrine’s precepts—the balance of offensive, defensive, and stability operations, the importance of intelligence-driven operations, the necessity of training host nation security forces, etc—remain valid in a post-anti-colonial era.  This result, however, only applies to domestic insurgencies.  Serious questions emerge about the doctrine when it is applied to regional or global insurgencies."

If you are interested in counterinsurgency operations at all, it is worth a look.  You can download the full text here.

Al-Qaeda Media Nexus: The Virtual Network Behind The Global Message (RFE)

Daniel Kimmage, a senior regional analyst at Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty has put together an excellent analytic paper (download full text here) designed to answer two questions (Note: taken directly from the Introduction): "What does the structure of jihadist media tell us about the relationship between Al-Qaeda central and the movements that affiliate themselves with it? And what can the priorities of jihadist media tell us about the operational priorities of Al-Qaeda and affiliated movements?" I found the large number of detailed charts and graphs (Click on the full text link above to get the report and the legend to the chart below) to be particularly useful as well.

Key Findings from the paper include (Boldface is mine):

• The ”original” Al-Qaeda led by Osama bin Laden accounts for a mere fraction of jihadist media production.

• Virtual media production and distribution entities link varied groups under the general ideological rubric of the global jihadist movement. The same media entities that “brand” jihadist media also create virtual links between the various armed groups that fall into the general category of Al-Qaeda and affiliated movements.

• Three key entities connect Al-Qaeda and affiliated movements to the outside world through the internet. These three media entities — Fajr, the Global Islamic Media Front, and Sahab — receive materials from more than one armed group and post those materials to the internet.

• Information operations intended to disrupt or undermine the effectiveness of jihadist media can and should target the media entities that brand these media and act as the virtual connective tissue of the global movement.

• While video is an important component of jihadist media, text products comprise the bulk of the daily media flow. Within text products, periodicals focused on specific “fronts” of the jihad are an important genre that deserves more attention from researchers.

• The vast majority of jihadist media products focus on conflict zones: Iraq, Afghanistan, and Somalia.

• The priorities of the global jihadist movement, as represented by its media arm, are operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, and North Africa.

• Jihadist media are attempting to mimic a “traditional” structure in order to boost credibility and facilitate message control. While conventional wisdom holds that jihadist media have been quick to exploit technological innovations to advance their cause, they are moving toward a more structured approach based on consistent branding and quasi-official media entities. Their reasons for doing so appear to be a desire to boost the credibility of their products and ensure message control.

• In line with this strategy, the daily flow of jihadist media that appears on the internet is consistently and systematically branded.