The Eleventh Balloon (DARPA Network Challenge)

I was discussing the DARPA Network Challenge with another participant in the contest the other day and the conclusion of our conversation led me to ask why couldn't a similar system be used to locate Osama bin Laden?

For those of you unfamiliar with this challenge, DARPA offered $40,000 to the first individual or team to identify the location of 10 large red helium balloons that DARPA had moored at various locations around the US. The contest was to go on for a week but a team from MIT won the challenge in a little less than 9 hours (for the Lessons Learned from the Mercyhurst effort, see this post).

It occurs to me that the Osama bin Laden problem is a similar one and that social networks might well be as effective in identifying his location (particularly if he is not in the region where most people seem to think he is...).

Moreover, the conditions are much the same -- only better. The reward for bin Laden is 25 million! MIT's winning system seemed to work so well (to me) because everyone in the chain got a piece of the pie. With a much bigger pie, it should work that much better.

Furthermore, there appears to be no reason not to try. Secretary Gates recently stated that there has been no good intelligence on bin Laden "in years". In addition, GEN McCrystal recently testified that he didn't think we could finally defeat Al Qaeda without capturing or killing Bin Laden.

And its not like Pakistanis and Afghanis don't use social networks. They do. Facebook and Orkut are both popular in Pakistan. If the system were optimized for cell phones, it would likely be even more effective as 49 of every 100 Pakistanis (29 of every 100 Afghanis) has a cell phone (Note: These are 2008 numbers. They are likely higher today.) Even the FATA in Pakistan has cellular service. If bin Laden is not where we think he is, then the system could be even more effective.

Using social networks allows us to tap into those people in and around bin Laden who disagree with his message or tactics or both but see no way to get their info to those who can do something about it (and frankly, even if they could, they likely see no advantage in it). It allows us to negotiate with the innocents who are victims of radicalism rather than continue to do business with the guilty that traditionally operate within the elite levels of a state.

Crowdsourcing the bin Laden hunt would also be a real test for these new technologies. A successful effort here would likely have as much impact on the practice of intelligence as 9/11 had on our thinking about terrorism.

So what say you, DARPA? The "eleventh balloon" is out there! Get with the Rewards for Justice people and announce another challenge (this time for some real money).

Bin Laden Found! (MIT International Review)

...according to two UCLA geography professors in the MIT International Review. Using what sounds a lot like IPB, they figured out where Bin Laden couldn't go, probably wouldn't go and narrowed down their estimate to one of three building complexes in Parachinar, Pakistan.

The image of the buildings is taken from the report (which is free to download) but they are just Google Earth pictures. All of the analysis is based on open sources and some reasonable assumptions and is getting some massive play on a variety of sites right now.

It reminds me a bit of what Jeff Carr did with the Grey Goose Project...

... And Bad News In Afghanistan (SENLIS)

I have to say up front that I am not familiar with the SENLIS Council. I stumbled on its November, 2007 report, "Stumbling Into Chaos: Afghanistan On The Brink" (Download full report here) by accident. The organization advertises itself as: "... an international policy think tank with country offices in Kabul, London, Ottawa, Rio de Janeiro, Paris and Brussels. The Council’s work encompasses foreign policy, security, development, and counter-narcotics policies, and aims to provide innovative analysis and proposals within these areas." Further research into its Board Of Advisors and recent activities also suggest that it is, at least, reasonably reputable.

The report (and the SENLIS website) is certainly worth reviewing. While the tone set by the title is often mirrored in the text, there are numerous excellent graphs and pictures based, presumably, on primary source info collected by SENLIS (I particularly appreciate the picture of the "Taliban Passport" and the chart showing the increase in the price of weapons in southern Afghanistan in 2007).

Highlights from the summary include (Boldface in original but italics are mine):

• "The Taliban has proven itself to be a truly resurgent force. Its ability to establish a presence throughout the country is now proven beyond doubt; research undertaken by Senlis Afghanistan indicates that 54 per cent of Afghanistan’s landmass hosts a permanent Taliban presence, primarily in southern Afghanistan, and is subject to frequent hostile activity by the insurgency."
  

• "The insurgency now controls vast swaths of unchallenged territory including rural areas, some district centres, and important road arteries. The Taliban are the de facto governing authority in significant portions of territory in the south, and are starting to control parts of the local economy and key infrastructure such as roads and energy supply. The insurgency also exercises a significant amount of psychological control, gaining more and more political legitimacy in the minds of the Afghan people who have a long history of shifting alliances and regime change."
  

• "The depressing conclusion is that, despite the vast injections of international capital flowing into the country, and a universal desire to ‘succeed’ in Afghanistan, the state is once again in serious danger of falling into the hands of the Taliban."
  

• "Of particular concern is the apparent import of tactics perfected in Iraq. The emboldened Taliban insurgency is employing such asymmetric warfare tactics as suicide bombings and roadside bombs, causing numerous casualties both among the civilian population and the international and national security forces." (Compare with this report. Is it possible that bin Laden has read Sun Tzu, too?)
  

• "Increased lawlessness and lack of government control in the border areas with Pakistan are directly and indirectly fueling the insurgency through the flow of new recruits, a stable financial and operational support base and ideological influence inspired by Al-Qaeda. With limited ground troops and facing a massive resistance, Afghan security forces supported by NATO-ISAF are struggling to contain the return of the Taliban."

In addition to this report by SENLIS, those interested in Afghanistan might also be interested in this map posted to the Intellibriefs blog. Caveat: Unlike SENLIS, the accuracy of the sources of the information in the Intellibriefs map is much more difficult to determine.

Mixed News On Al Qaeda And Iraq... (CRS)

Secrecy News just picked up and posted the newly updated CRS report on "Iraq and Al Qaeda" (Download the full text here). While the report does not provide any solid answers on the current level of Al Qaeda activity in Iraq or the the degree to which it is tied to Bin Laden, it does do a good job of laying out the history and arguments on all sides. Highlights from the summary and full text include (Boldface is mine):

• "Although the connections between Ansar al-Islam and Saddam Hussein’s regime were subject to debate, the organization apparently did evolve into what is now known as Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQ-I). AQ-I has been a key component of the Sunni Arab-led insurgency that frustrated U.S. efforts to stabilize Iraq, but there is debate about how large and significant a component of overall violence was carried out by AQ-I. In mid-late 2007, in part facilitated by combat conducted by additional U.S. forces sent to Iraq as part of a “troop surge,” the U.S. military has had some success exploiting differences between AQ-I and Iraqi Sunni political, tribal, and insurgent leaders. These successes, which in some cases have resulted in the virtual expulsion of AQ-I from many of its sanctuaries particularly in and around Baghdad, have weakened AQ-I to the point where some U.S. commanders believe they have achieved “victory” over AQ-I. However, the most senior U.S. commanders believe it has not been completely defeated and remains dangerous, and some U.S. commanders assert that AQ-I fighters have relocated to parts of northern Iraq."
  

• "Analysis of the broader implications of AQ-I might depend on the degree to which AQ-I is in contact with the remaining leadership of the Al Qaeda organization as it has evolved since the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States. That relationship remains a subject of debate among experts."
  

• "... perhaps the most controversial question about AQ-I is the degree to which it is linked, if at all, to the central leadership of Al Qaeda as represented by Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, both of whom are widely believed to be hiding in areas of Pakistan near the border with Afghanistan."
  

• "... on July 24, 2007, President Bush devoted a speech almost exclusively to this issue. In making an argument that AQ-I is closely related to Al Qaeda’s central leadership, the President noted the following details, including:"
  

• "In 2004, Zarqawi formally joined Al Qaeda and pledged allegiance to bin Laden"
  

• "In line with the increasing AQ-I efforts to cooperate with Iraqi Sunni insurgents, most of AQ-I’s fighters and some of its leaders are Iraqi."
  

• "That AQ-I is the only insurgent group in Iraq “with stated ambitions to make the country a base for attacks outside Iraq.” Referring to the November 9, 2005, terrorist attacks on hotels in Zarqawi’s native Jordan, President Bush said AQ-I “dispatched terrorists who bombed a wedding reception in Jordan.”
  

• "Some experts believe that links between Al Qaeda’s central leadership and AQ-I are tenuous, at best, and that the few operatives linking the two do not demonstrate an ongoing, substantial relationship."
  

• "Still others maintain that there is little evidence that AQ-I seeks to attack broadly outside Iraq, and that those incidents that have taken place have been in Jordan, where Zarqawi might have wanted to try to undermine King Abdullah II, whom Zarqawi opposed as too close to the United States. There have been no attacks in mid-late 2007 that can be directly attributed to AQ-I."