Showing posts with label Taliban. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Taliban. Show all posts

Tuesday, October 6, 2009

Email Hoaxes Aimed At Intel Professionals (!), New Report On The Pakistani Military And Rising Ethnic Violence In The UK (Link List)

A number of interesting reports have come out over the last several days. Here are three that caught my eye:
  • The Institute of South Asian Studies (out of the National University of Singapore and via the ISN) has recently issued a report on the Pakistani military under General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani. Given all the recent bad news about Afghanistan, this report is remarkably optimistic, claiming that Kayani "does not harbor ambitions of interfering in politics" and that "crushing the Taliban now seems to be an objective that General Kayani is strongly committed to."
  • ISN has also just published an Intel Brief on the rising ethnic tension in the UK between Islamic and Skinhead groups. The article, written by Mercyhurst alumna, Ania Dunin, claims that the right-wing English Defense League has been "deliberately trying to provoke a response from ethnic minorities in order to create wider violence and mayhem" and that the extremist groups "will likely pose a significant security threat in the UK in the near future, not due to their manpower, but to their tactics."
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Wednesday, May 13, 2009

Excellent BBC Map, Special Report On Afghan-Pakistan Border (News.BBC.co.uk)


The BBC has put together a very useful interactive map regarding the current situation on the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The picture on the left is just a thumbnail. You can get to the full map (and report) by clicking here or on the picture.

In addition to the map, the BBC has included some audio reports, related stories and even a methodology(!) section. I am not an expert in this area so I cannot vouch for the underlying accuracy of the analysis but it is an effort that is well worth checking out.

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Friday, January 18, 2008

Recent Testimony On US-Pakistan Relations (RAND)

RAND's C. Christine Fair testified in front of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia on January 16, 2008 on the subject of "U.S.-Pakistan Relations: Assassination, Instability, and the Future of U.S. Policy" (Download full text here).

Highlights from the testimony include (boldface, hyperlinks and italics mine except where noted):

  • "Pakistan is perhaps the most important U.S. partner in the war on terrorism. Not only has Pakistan lost more personnel in this conflict than any other ally, critical fuel for vehicles and aircraft used in the war effort in Afghanistan moves through Pakistan without problem. Without this logistical support, both Operation Enduring Freedom and NATO operations in Afghanistan would prove very difficult to sustain without interruption. While there is no doubt that Pakistan is a crucial ally of the United States, it is a state mired in instability and uncertainty. This raises questions about the will and capacity of Pakistan’s leadership to remain engaged in the war on terrorism."
  • "Both Washington and Islamabad have made decisions that have precipitated this current crisis. "
    • 'For Washington’s part, by focusing upon President and former Chief of Army Staff Pervez Musharraf and by acquiescing to his various extra-constitutional moves, it has alienated further the Pakistani polity who harbor various suspicions about the United States and its intentions."
    • "For Islamabad’s part, President Musharraf has increasingly sought to secure his political position and has imposed excessive constraints upon an ever-more mobilized civil society, who should be important partners in fighting extremism in Pakistan. At the same time, Musharraf has shown his incapacity to both control the Islamist violence that is roiling his country and to lead his country to fight it."
  • "In recent years the chasm between American interests and those of President Musharraf has dramatically expanded. Specifically, the United States would like to see stability, consistent action against al Qaeda and Taliban forces operating in and from Pakistan, greater efforts to curb a wide array of Islamist militant groups in the country and most recently greater moves towards at the least the procedures of democracy if not the substance. It has become clear in recent years that President Musharraf, while he may share some of these concerns, has increasingly become focused upon securing his personal future—not that of Pakistan."
  • "Thus there is urgent need to reconsider the lineaments of the U.S-Pakistan relationship and the reciprocal expectations that each state holds of the other."
  • "These extra-constitutional and other policies (Ed. Note: Described in detail in the full text) of the Musharraf government rendered free and fair elections in January 2008 improbable."
  • "While maximally free and fair elections are a necessary precondition for stabilizing Pakistan in the near term, the elections alone are insufficient."
  • "Pakistan’s effort to counter insurgents in the Pashtun belt and beyond requires political legitimacy, which Musharraf lacks. I am optimistic than an elected prime minister can be motivated to continue the fight. With a new army chief who is not seen as Washington’s protégé, General Kiyani may be able to rally his armed forces more effectively than Musharraf." (Note: Italics in original)
  • "Thus the heroic task before the United States is how it can selectively use aid and military funding to encourage the likelihood of a free and fair election, a military retreat from politics and a gradual evolution of competent and effective politics and politicians in Pakistan."
  • "To win the confidence of FATA residents, the Pakistan government has been requesting development funds for this area for several years. At long last, the United States has agreed to spend some $750 million in FATA. At this juncture, it is difficult to be optimistic about the impact of these funds. (Perhaps had this funding been available before the onset of the wider insurgency such pessimism would be unwarranted.) Unfortunately, the security environment will render such projects very difficult particularly if the United States seeks to “brand” those developments in effort to garner good will."
  • 'Regarding command and control and the security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, most dedicated Pakistan analysts have no reason to believe that existing policies and procedures are inadequate at this juncture."
  • "In the short term, the United States must work to help achieve a democratic transition in Pakistan—not a democratic patina by which to legitimize President Musharraf."
  • "The United States should work to support institutions and processes and demure from supporting or undermining particular persons or institutions."
  • "However, over the medium and long term, there is urgent need to structurally re-shape the terms of U.S. assistance to Pakistan."
  • "While re-optimizing the assistance to the Pakistan military, the U.S. must dramatically expand programmed assistance to reform all of Pakistan’s civilian institutions including the judiciary, police and law enforcement; to train large numbers of politicians; support major civil society institutions such as those dedicated to monitoring human rights, corruption mitigation, political reconciliation, human development and the like through financial resources and capacity building."

Friday, December 21, 2007

... And Bad News In Afghanistan (SENLIS)

I have to say up front that I am not familiar with the SENLIS Council. I stumbled on its November, 2007 report, "Stumbling Into Chaos: Afghanistan On The Brink" (Download full report here) by accident. The organization advertises itself as: "... an international policy think tank with country offices in Kabul, London, Ottawa, Rio de Janeiro, Paris and Brussels. The Council’s work encompasses foreign policy, security, development, and counter-narcotics policies, and aims to provide innovative analysis and proposals within these areas." Further research into its Board Of Advisors and recent activities also suggest that it is, at least, reasonably reputable.

The report (and the SENLIS website) is certainly worth reviewing. While the tone set by the title is often mirrored in the text, there are numerous excellent graphs and pictures based, presumably, on primary source info collected by SENLIS (I particularly appreciate the picture of the "Taliban Passport" and the chart showing the increase in the price of weapons in southern Afghanistan in 2007).

Highlights from the summary include (Boldface in original but italics are mine):

  • "The Taliban has proven itself to be a truly resurgent force. Its ability to establish a presence throughout the country is now proven beyond doubt; research undertaken by Senlis Afghanistan indicates that 54 per cent of Afghanistan’s landmass hosts a permanent Taliban presence, primarily in southern Afghanistan, and is subject to frequent hostile activity by the insurgency."
  • "The insurgency now controls vast swaths of unchallenged territory including rural areas, some district centres, and important road arteries. The Taliban are the de facto governing authority in significant portions of territory in the south, and are starting to control parts of the local economy and key infrastructure such as roads and energy supply. The insurgency also exercises a significant amount of psychological control, gaining more and more political legitimacy in the minds of the Afghan people who have a long history of shifting alliances and regime change."
  • "The depressing conclusion is that, despite the vast injections of international capital flowing into the country, and a universal desire to ‘succeed’ in Afghanistan, the state is once again in serious danger of falling into the hands of the Taliban."
  • "Of particular concern is the apparent import of tactics perfected in Iraq. The emboldened Taliban insurgency is employing such asymmetric warfare tactics as suicide bombings and roadside bombs, causing numerous casualties both among the civilian population and the international and national security forces." (Compare with this report. Is it possible that bin Laden has read Sun Tzu, too?)
  • "Increased lawlessness and lack of government control in the border areas with Pakistan are directly and indirectly fueling the insurgency through the flow of new recruits, a stable financial and operational support base and ideological influence inspired by Al-Qaeda. With limited ground troops and facing a massive resistance, Afghan security forces supported by NATO-ISAF are struggling to contain the return of the Taliban."
In addition to this report by SENLIS, those interested in Afghanistan might also be interested in this map posted to the Intellibriefs blog. Caveat: Unlike SENLIS, the accuracy of the sources of the information in the Intellibriefs map is much more difficult to determine.