Improving Intelligence Analysis: Two Methods Are Better Than One (USIP)

It one of what has to be the most lucid papers I have read in a long while, Jack Goldstone, writing for the US Institute Of Peace, clearly and concisely explains the value of using multiple independent analytic methods in forecasting instability. His paper, titled "Using Quantitative And Qualitative Models to Forecast Instability" (download full text here), is a real gem that will be of use to academics, students and professionals. Goldstone is a Professor at George Mason and also the Director of the Center For Global Policy (The Center appears to do some extremely interesting research but some of it is hidden, unfortunately, behind a paywall).

Highlights from the Summary include (Boldface, hyperlinks and italics are mine):

• For most of the post–World War II period, policymakers and intelligence agencies have relied on experts to make qualitative judgments regarding the risk of instability or violent changes in their areas of study. Yet the inability of such experts to adequately predict major events has led to efforts to use social and analytical tools to create more “scientific” forecasts of political crises. (Note: Goldstone also cites the work of Phillip Tetlock favorably in this regard).
  

• Because certain models have a demonstrated accuracy of over 80 percent in early identification of political crises, some have questioned whether such models should replace traditional qualitative analysis.

• While these quantitative forecasting methods should move to the foreground and play a key role in developing early warning tools, this does not mean that traditional qualitative analysis is dispensable.

• The best results for early warning are most likely obtained by the judicious combination of quantitative analysis based on forecasting models with qualitative analysis that rests on explicit causal relationships and precise forecasts of its own. (Note: Such an approach was explicitly used by my students in their project on the role of non-state actors in sub-Saharan Africa).
  

• Policymakers and analysts should insist on a multiple-method approach, which has greater forecasting power than either the quantitative or qualitative method alone. In this way, political instability forecasting is likely to make its largest advance over earlier practices.

Intel Jobs Requiring Wiki Experience (Creativeheads.net)

One of my students (Thanks, again, Pat!) sent me this interesting job listing. What struck him and me is that the job responsibilities include "Monitor and respond to NGA internal technical forums, Wikipedia and Intelipedia sites". While this job is more tech support than analysis, I find it interesting that such a requirement is creeping into the intel community. I wonder how long it will be before intel analyst jobs have, as a "Desired Skill", an understanding of wikis and wiki software?

Wiki Vs. Email Grudge Match (Organizational Theory And Collaboration)

One of my students (Thanks, Pat!) sent me a very interesting post by Manny Wilson over at Organizational Theory and Collaboration. Apparently, Mr. Wilson put together the graphic below when he was at CENTCOM and trying to explain the difference between working via email and working through a wiki. This graphic was then picked up by Chris Rasmussen at NGA and used in its presentations on the same topic and was then re-posted by the Wikinomics blog (twice) a couple of weeks ago.

It manages to capture in an easy to understand graphic the same point I struggled to make with words in my recent article, "A Wiki Is Like A Room..." That is, wikis save time because they cut down on "transaction costs" within a group. Individually, each transaction only takes a small amount of extra time but over the life of the project, this time adds up to a considerable loss that could have been put to use doing additional analysis. It also stands to reason that the larger the group, the more time the group will save, all other things being equal, by using a wiki.

Al-Qaeda Media Nexus: The Virtual Network Behind The Global Message (RFE)

Daniel Kimmage, a senior regional analyst at Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty has put together an excellent analytic paper (download full text here) designed to answer two questions (Note: taken directly from the Introduction): "What does the structure of jihadist media tell us about the relationship between Al-Qaeda central and the movements that affiliate themselves with it? And what can the priorities of jihadist media tell us about the operational priorities of Al-Qaeda and affiliated movements?" I found the large number of detailed charts and graphs (Click on the full text link above to get the report and the legend to the chart below) to be particularly useful as well.

Key Findings from the paper include (Boldface is mine):

• The ”original” Al-Qaeda led by Osama bin Laden accounts for a mere fraction of jihadist media production.

• Virtual media production and distribution entities link varied groups under the general ideological rubric of the global jihadist movement. The same media entities that “brand” jihadist media also create virtual links between the various armed groups that fall into the general category of Al-Qaeda and affiliated movements.

• Three key entities connect Al-Qaeda and affiliated movements to the outside world through the internet. These three media entities — Fajr, the Global Islamic Media Front, and Sahab — receive materials from more than one armed group and post those materials to the internet.

• Information operations intended to disrupt or undermine the effectiveness of jihadist media can and should target the media entities that brand these media and act as the virtual connective tissue of the global movement.

• While video is an important component of jihadist media, text products comprise the bulk of the daily media flow. Within text products, periodicals focused on specific “fronts” of the jihad are an important genre that deserves more attention from researchers.

• The vast majority of jihadist media products focus on conflict zones: Iraq, Afghanistan, and Somalia.

• The priorities of the global jihadist movement, as represented by its media arm, are operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, and North Africa.

• Jihadist media are attempting to mimic a “traditional” structure in order to boost credibility and facilitate message control. While conventional wisdom holds that jihadist media have been quick to exploit technological innovations to advance their cause, they are moving toward a more structured approach based on consistent branding and quasi-official media entities. Their reasons for doing so appear to be a desire to boost the credibility of their products and ensure message control.

• In line with this strategy, the daily flow of jihadist media that appears on the internet is consistently and systematically branded.

IntelFusion Remixes Peterson's Table Of Analytic Confidence Assessment (IntelFusion)

Jeff Carr over at IntelFusion has added his own twist to Josh Peterson's recent work on analytic confidence. Jeff's remix is a good visualization (see below) of what Josh was getting at in his thesis. See the full post here and the IntelFusion main page here.